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The drought of the 1950s was among the most widespread, severe and sustained ever experienced in the
United States. For several states, the severity of the 1950s drought exceeded that of the 1930s “Dust
Bowl”. The 1950s were characterized by low rainfall amounts and by excessively high temperatures. The
climatological aspects of the drought subsided in most areas with the spring rains of 1957. A careful
review of ofﬁcial reports over this period reveals limited acknowledgment of the drought of the 1950s.
The drought was no secret, but it did not receive a great deal of news coverage; later droughts of lower
severity and shorter duration, such as 1976–77, 1988, 2002–2004, 2011–2012 and the ongoing drought in
California (2011–2015), garnered much greater national focus. In this paper, the question why such a
major geophysical variation appears to have elicited little major national policy response, including the
apparent lack of signiﬁcant media concern is addressed. In framing the discussion this study assesses, the
evolution of drought during the 1950s to establish its national and regional policy contexts, technological
improvements and ﬁnancial changes prior to and during the event, and on and off-farm responses in
terms of the socioeconomic impacts. The study provides an overview of key developments and concerns
in agriculture since the early 20th Century sets the context for the 1950s, then moves to the farm itself as
a unit of analysis. This approach shows not only how the situation may have appeared to those outside
the afﬂicted areas, but also how decisions were guided by agricultural economics affecting farmers at the
time, and the strong inﬂuence of broader historical trends in which the 1950s were embedded. The paper
provides the relevant agricultural statistics and uncovers the political and public perceptions moving
through the drought years. Overproduction was the fundamental, almost paradoxical problem facing
American agriculture at the time. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the implications of this
event, and the attendant responses, might provide guidance to future assessments of extremes such as
severe drought in the context of a changing climate.
& 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The post-war 1950s is widely perceived as a period of optimism
and prosperity in the U.S., and remains such in the American
imagination. But, in the midst of this period of growth, the Great
Plains and the southwestern U.S. were experiencing multi-year
drought. By 1954, the drought reached from Ohio to Nevada and
from Wyoming to Georgia, with the most extreme conditions in
the mid-west, the Great Plains, and southward into New Mexico,
reaching a peak in 1956 (Fig. 1). The 1950s drought was char-
acterized by both low rainfall amounts and excessively high
temperatures. In 1953, 75% of Texas recorded below normaln open access article under the C
lwarty).rainfall amounts, with temperatures in Dallas exceeding 100 °F on
52 days during that summer. Kansas recorded a negative Palmer
Drought Severity Index from 1952 until March 1957, with a record
low in September of 1956. The drought subsided in most areas
with the spring rains of 1957. The droughts of the 1930s and the
1950s remain the benchmarks in terms of duration, severity, and
spatial extent over much of the midWest in the 20th century
(Layzell and Evans, 2013; Woodhouse and Overpeck, 1998).
The U.S. President's annual Economic Reports (Eisenhower,
1954 through 1961) provide an unusually clear indication of
abiding concern and an exposition and justiﬁcation of policy.
These Economic Reports have great value as indicators of the po-
litical mainstream's views of economic problems and possibilities
(Peterson, 1979), however a review for this period reveals almost
no acknowledgment of the drought of the 1950s. There is serious
consideration in reports to Congress from a well-publicizedC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Palmer drought severity index: climatological divisions June 1950 to June 1957.
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during the prolonged drought, and a report to the President from
The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning
(1958), but by the time these ofﬁcial statements appeared, the
crisis was already waning.
A useful analogy, on the lack of warning, may be drawn from
Sherlock Holmes.
‘Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my
attention?’
‘To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.’
‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’
‘That was the curious incident,’ remarked Sherlock Holmes.
–Arthur Conan Doyle, “Silver Blaze” (1892)
Holmes solved the case because a dog did not bark when it
should have, indicating that the malefactor was known to the dog.
Considering the socioeconomic context of the 1950s drought in
the United States is similar to asking why the dog did not bark:
why there was so little major policy response even with such a
large climatic bite? Why was there an apparent lack of news media
concern? In the following discussion, these questions are ad-
dressed at the national level as a complement to regional and local
assessments, which suggest the extent of hardship suffered in the
affected areas.
This paper assesses, the evolution of drought and impacts
during the 1950s to establish their national and regional policy
contexts, technological improvements and ﬁnancial changes prior
to and during the event, and on and off-farm responses in terms of
the socioeconomic impacts. The study begins with an overview of
key developments in agriculture leading up to the 1950s, the view
of the drought at the national level, a survey of “ofﬁcial histories”
and agricultural statistics, a description of the demographic con-
text, and then a review of public perceptions at the time and how
they may have reﬂected in images born of the “dirty 30s.” The
socioeconomic context of the farm itself as a unit of analysis is
then outlined. These topics show how the situation may have
appeared to those outside the afﬂicted areas, and how decisions
were affected by the agricultural economics faced by farmers at
the time, and the broader historical trends in which the 1950s
were embedded.
A large and growing literature on climate impacts is available,
because of concern over global environmental change (Ojima,
et al., 2002; Wagner, 2003; Gleick 1990; Reilly et al. 2001, 2003;
Melillo et al. 2014). These reviews (and arguably many subse-
quently produced) seem to presume that new information will
provide an impetus for new responses; unfortunately, that is not
clear. The 1950s drought was no secret, but it did not have a large
media presence such as later droughts of lower severity and
shorter duration, such as 1976–77, 1988, 1998, 2000–2004, 2011–
2012 and the ongoing drought in California (2011–2015) attracted
far more attention. Of additional note is that the drought was in-
deed more severe in some locations than the Dust Bowl years it is
not recalled in the collective memory with commensurate sig-
niﬁcance. Here, the question of why such a major geophysical
variation appears to have had a relatively minor national policy
impact is considered. The approach taken follows that of Vayda
(1983), working from the event outward toward the social re-
sponses, or their absence, and Lasswell's problem orientation
(clarifying goals, trends, conditioning factors on those trends, and
alternatives (Lasswell, 1971). A fundamental, almost paradoxical
problem facing American agriculture at the time was over-
production. The paper notes the political and public perceptions
moving through the drought years. Finally, a series of questions is
included, which we hope, may guide future assessments of ex-
tremes such as severe drought, in the context of a changing
climate.2. The evolution of adjustment: getting to the Fifties
A general history might deﬁne the “golden era” of U.S. agri-
culture as roughly encompassing the period from 1897 to 1920
(Fite, 1964). The continuing pressure for “parity” in farm prices
dates from this time. The “parity” goal was for the relative pur-
chasing power of farm products to remain nearly constant, so that
farmers would not be adversely affected by their own success in
production and other economic pressures. This appealed to
farmers and their legislative representatives, and to the ideal of
the yeoman farmer leading the agrarian and virtuous life. The
measures or indices for purchasing power were originally derived
from the farm prices of 1910–1914, when the desired balance ex-
isted between farm products and prices for other goods (Fite,
1964). The “parity” measure was used to set price supports or
targets for various farm programs. This was particularly important
when farmers were subsequently faced by the dramatic loss of
about 40 percent of farm income in the crash after World War I.
After this, farmers suffered in the droughts of the 20s and 30s, as
well as from the Depression; many succumbed to the price
squeeze of plummeting crop values but stagnant input costs.
Agriculture's purchasing power (e.g. from a bushel of wheat
compared to other prices) in 1921 was literally 1/3 less than in
1913 (Fite, 1964: 5–9), despite increased land values and capital
costs. For farmers, the Depression arrived early, but not until 1933
was there direct Federal government support. New Deal programs
and the war markets of the early 40s were followed by sustained
high price supports in the late 40s and early 50s. Farm ﬁnancial
conditions going into the 50s Drought were dramatically better
than those in the 30s.
The agricultural supports created in the Depression remain
remarkably little changed (Cochrane and Runge, 1992; Glauber,
2013). In 1933, three highly-signiﬁcant Federal Acts were passed as
part of President Franklin Roosevelt's “New Deal,”. These Acts
shaped the future of US Agriculture through the 1950s and into the
present. The ﬁrst, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, was a major
farm support legislation, including cash payments for farmers who
agree to reduce acreage in crops. This is a persistent approach
intended to reduce the surpluses that depressed prices, and the
amounts of subsidy needed, as well as the farmers' losses. The
second major act of 1933 was the creation of the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC). The Corporation offered farmers what
became known as the “non-recourse” loan”: the CCC offered to
“loan” an amount to the farmer equal to an estimated fair price for
the anticipated crop. If the market price was greater than the
“loan”, the farmer would sell, pay back the loan and keep the
difference. If the market price proved lower than the “loan”,
however, the farmer would deliver the crop to a CCC-designated
collection point. The loans were dubbed “non-recourse” because in
the event of failure (such as crop loss to hail or drought), the CCC's
capacity to recover the loan was limited to the crop only, without
recourse to the farm or other assets. A principal qualiﬁcation,
however, was the requirement for reduced crop acreage in order to
procure these loans. The ﬁrst Agricultural Adjustment Act was
held unconstitutional in 1936, and replaced by another “AAA” in
1938, which required that 2/3 of the producers of a given crop
would have to agree to the allotment (acreage reduction) pro-
grams for them to be effective. A third important Act of 1933,
however, also had a tremendous effect on rural life and farming
practice: the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a
complex regional development scheme which combined ﬂood
control, industrial and recreational development with generation
of abundant, cheap hydroelectric power which would serve as a
“yardstick” for power costs nationwide.
The TVA opened the door to farmers seeking electricity. The
creation in 1935 of the Rural Electriﬁcation Administration made a
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(compared to private) costs to reach newly-served rural con-
sumers. In 1930, about one in ten farmsteads used electricity, ei-
ther from main lines or self-generated; by 1940, four out of ten
did, (and the number rose to ninety percent by 1950; Leuchten-
berg, 1963: 157–58). By 1940, the combination of these initiatives,
better weather and, then, war-time boom markets restored much
of American agriculture's well-being. The main drivers of policy
appeared to be fear of another post-war “crash”, but which did not
materialize.
Ninety percent of “parity” was promised for the ﬁrst years after
World War II. In 1948 and 1949, parity could have been as low as
60 percent as the basis for continuing farm-support programs, but
the support level was kept high by Congress. The Korean War and
accompanying markets kept prices high through 1953. President
Eisenhower's ﬁrst Cabinet took ofﬁce in January 1953 facing both
acreage allotments and price supports aiming to provide 90 per-
cent of parity (the last a campaign promise), both at the expense of
the Federal budget (Fite, 1964; Benson, 1962: 38–9, et passim).
The “crisis being faced, coincident with the drought, was a
persistent national agricultural commodity glut and the pressure
from farm interests to keep paying for it. Samuel Waugh, Assistant
Secretary of State, said in 1953: ‘Surplus agricultural commodities
are the next most important national problem to that of balancing
the budget'…” (Peterson, 1979: 32).
As noted above, the President's economic reports (Eisenhower,
1954–1961) illustrate mainstream understandings of the time. The
1954 report (the series is issued in January; thus reﬂecting the
previous year, in this case 1953) noted the continuing need to
stabilize the farm economy after the Korean War and adjustment
to peacetime. Echoing themes sounded in campaign literature of
1952 and mainstream Republican economic prescriptions, the re-
port asserted that the role of the government should be limited,
but a high and sustained rate of growth “is necessary to the wel-
fare, if not the survival, of America and the free world. The United
States is now engaged, and must be for some time to come, in an
effort to build security forces adequate to deter and to strike back
at aggression.” (Eisenhower, 1954: 3). The stated conditions of
progress included individual freedom, adequate incentives, effec-
tive competition, savings and capital formation, research and de-
velopment, maintenance of economic stability, a ﬂoor of individual
security, and a world community of free nations (Eisenhower,
1954: 4).
“Agriculture, which is beset with more problems than any
other major part of our economy, will continue to be con-
fronted in 1954 with problems growing out of excessive sup-
plies of some of the major farm products – notably wheat,
cotton and corn…. By July 1954, the wheat carry-over may be
about 800 million bushels, more than three times its mid-1952
level and well in excess of a year's domestic use. By August
1954, the cotton carry-over may reach 9.6 million bales, also
more than three times its level two years earlier and the
equivalent of a year's domestic mill consumption…” (Ei-
senhower 1954: 69).3. Agricultural production in the 1950s
In the report for calendar year 1954, output from the preceding
year is recorded as equal to the record level reported in 1953, even
though wheat and cotton were reduced from their potential by 17
and 18 percent, respectively, by use of marketing quotas. Diverted
acreage was, however, used for feed and seed, leading to record
highs in livestock production. In 1955, the readjustment to
peacetime was still not fully accomplished. The January 1956Economic Report noted that farm output was steadily up and
prices steadily declining. At the behest of (then) Agriculture Se-
cretary Ezra Taft Benson, price supports were made “ﬂexible” in
1954, allowing administration ofﬁcials rather than Congress to
adjust the levels, but the percentage of parity stayed greater than
60 percent and very commonly higher than 75 percent (Fite, 1964).
The federal crop insurance program begun in 1938, with persistent
characteristics of low participation, high losses, and continuing
political support probably related to highly concentrated beneﬁts
in relatively few Congressional districts (Goodwin and Smith,
1995; Glauber 2004; 2007; Dismukes and Glauber, 2005); the
1950s did not affect this pattern.
Wheat consumption in 1953 in the U.S. was similar to that in
1914, but production had increased from 724 million to 1169
million bushels and only about 2/3 of the surplus could be ex-
ported. Cotton was similarly affected due to big increases in pro-
duction coupled with decreases in domestic consumption (Ei-
senhower, 1954: 89–91). High prices for meat and hides had led to
excessive expansion of herds and a subsequent price collapse; at
the same time, cheap feed provided an ill-timed encouragement or
temptation to expand herds (see also Bonner and Ward, 1955).
By October 1954, corn reserves of more than 900 million
bushels represented nearly twice the 1952 level. “The price-de-
pressing effects of these stocks will, however, be substantially
offset during 1954 by Government price-support operations,
acreage restrictions, and other measures.” (Eisenhower, 1954: 69).
In the previous year, increased sales had offset depressed prices,
but not enough to keep agricultural income from falling 7.4 per-
cent; the cattle raisers were hardest hit. Overall, farmers' net in-
comes began to decline in 1947 and continued to fall through
1953. Between 1947 and 1953, operators' real net income per farm
fell almost one third, but 1947 marked an all-time peak in realized
net farm income, and agriculture was proclaimed to be still in
relatively good ﬁnancial condition (Eisenhower, 1954: 53, 89).
“Widespread drought added to the troubles of the year, especially
of cattle farmers.” (Eisenhower, 1954: 53). But the only other
mention of drought was a short following note that relief had been
extended promptly to the farms in drought-stricken areas, in-
cluding extensive beef purchases to check the decline in prices and
beneﬁt school lunches, and some gifts for famine relief were made
abroad (Eisenhower, 1954: 54).
Finally, in acknowledging the central role of such programs as
the Commodity Credit Corporation (which increased its commit-
ments to approximately $3 Billion in 1953) and other agricultural
supports, the administration noted a central contradiction in its
major agricultural support program. Reliance on acreage allot-
ments per crop, in which a farmer is, essentially, paid to not grow
that crop on some farmable acres, was not accompanied by quotas
on total production or by restrictions on what else might be grown
on the acres retired from production of the supported crop. As a
result, acreage allotments, coupled with high price supports and
no limits on sales, “encourage(d) rapid increases in the per-acre
yields of price-supported crops and larger output of unsupported
crops on the diverted acres.” (Eisenhower, 1954: 95). By 1959, the
Commodity Credit Corporation had lost more than $9 Billion.
One apparent feature of Table 1 on wheat production is that the
data appear to defy any clear connection to the drought of the
1950s. The production capacity overwhelmed what only two
decades previously had been a crippling natural “intervention.”
One striking constant revealed by the ﬁgures in Table 1 is the high
level of carry-over and winter wheat on hand in mid-summer
even during the years of deepest drought in the “bread belt.” The
power of price supports can not be overlooked.
Cotton was important in the drought areas, and like the other
crops, it was also marketed within a much larger national arena,
and the international markets as well. During the decade (Table 2),
Table 1
Wheat production 1950–1959.
Wheat (all types)
Planted
(1000ac)
Harvested Harvested
% of ac.
planted
Farm value
of crop
($M)
Wheat
Produc-
tion
(1000 bu)
as of July
1
Estimated
stocks on
hand,
Wheat,
millions of
bu.
1950 71,287 61,607 86.4
percent
$2,042,296 1,019,344 425
1951 78,524 61,873 78.8 2,088,739 988,161 400
1952 78,645 71,130 90.4 2,729,402 1,306,440 256
1953 78,931 67,840 85.9 2,390,936 1,173,071 606
1954 62,539 54,356 86.9 2,082,485 983,900 934
1955 58,241 47,285 81.2 1,854,551 934,731 1036
1956 60,658 49,784 82.1 1,974,174 1,004,272 1033
1957 49,852 43,806 87.9 1,839,074 950,662 908
1958 56,269 53,404 94.9 2,550,995 1,461,714 881
1959 59,043 53,024 91.4 1,988,562 1,128,151 1277
*** Sources: 1s 655, 656, 1, and p.51, USDA Agricultural Statistics, 1960.
Table 2
Cotton production and value (from USDA (1960) Ag. stats, p. 60).
Production (1000
Bales)
Value at farm
($1000)
New Orleans market prices,
cents per pound
1950 10,014 2,005,684 42.30
1951 15,149 2,868,720 39.97
1952 15,139 2,617,644 34.40
1953 16,465 2,654,683 33.35
1954 13,696 2,301,212 33.96
1955 14,721 2,379,030 34.28
1956 13,310 2,112,625 33.64
1957 10,964 1,625,119 34.50
1958 11,512 1,912,311 34.31
1959 14,551 2,281,300 31.43
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its 1950 per-bale value (unadjusted for inﬂation).
One might expect less cotton in a year subsequent to one in
which prices fell, yet planted acreage did not drop sharply until
1954, and then another decrease in planting in 1955, followed by
fairly steady planting until a notable drop in 1957 and another
smaller drop in 1958. The ﬁrst impulse for many may have been to
plant more to compensate for lower prices when possible to ex-
pand, but the decision is complicated by the option of payments to
reduce planting. The payment to reduce planting may stimulate
increased planting acreage so that there is more to reduce. This is
sometimes crop-speciﬁc, establishing “base acreage” and beyond
the scope of this article (see Fite, 1964; Cochrane and Runge, 1992).
Acreage reduction might help dampen production at the limits of
efﬁciency, but for many American farmers, harvesting more out of
fewer acres was merely a matter of plowing and planting from
fence to fence, then accepting federal acreage-reduction monies as
a bonus. This behavior made – and makes – sense in light of the
problem facing any farmer: how to match operations to the im-
perfectly predictable future market, and how to do so where policy
and aid programs will almost always be national, but weather and
other adverse conditions may be local, regional, or national. The
conundrum facing the farmer was and is that of complex causality:
the net effects of weather and climate variation were largely
overwhelmed in the aggregate by ﬂuctuations of national policy
and ﬁnancial environments.
Borchert (1971) noted that even in 1956 in the peak of disaster
declarations, government payments were still less than 3 percent
of total farm income. More than 1000 counties were designatedfor disaster relief (Eisenhower, 1957), and drought was the leading
cause of payment in the Federal Crop Insurance program (Saarinen
1966, and see exhaustive analyses of Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration and wheat losses by Hewes (1958, 1975, 1979). Partici-
pation in the Federal Crop Insurance program was, however, vo-
luntary and thus limited in various ways by farmers themselves as
well as by FCIC itself, which could –and did – withdraw coverage
from counties. Saarinen notes that the FCIC withdrew from 14
“Dust Bowl” counties following the 1955 crop year (1966: 8).
Certainly, there were very difﬁcult times for afﬂicted localities.
Between 1950 and 1960, Texas lost nearly 100,000 farms and
ranches, and rural residents who had made up more than a third
of the population dwindled to a quarter of the population. The
agriculture losses exceeded those of the Dust Bowl years, and
kicked off the modern era of water planning in Texas (Lower
Colorado River Authority, 2014). However, by all reports, the hu-
man impact was dramatically less than in the 1930s.
Farmers were not the only parties directly affected by the dry
thirties: urban water and sewage problems emerged during in the
1930s, and some reappeared in the 1950s drought (Borchert, 1971,
Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning, 1958),
though these received little detailed description (see United States
Geological Survey for compilations of water use data). One case,
however, that of Wichita, Kansas, has been carefully described
(Aucott and Myers, 1998). The steady urbanization of the region
before the drought years of the 1950s is noted below in the section
on demographics. The extent to which the drought hastened off-
farm migration within the region is difﬁcult to judge (Warrick
1983), but the overall trend was certainly clear at the time and has
continued (Adamchak et al., 1999; Ojima et al., 2002).
The Report of the Special Assistant to the President for Public
Works Planning (1958) noted the widespread human suffering,
although “Programs at all levels of government helped to soften
the effects…” (p. 25). Various ﬁnancial costs are also noted, such as
more than $100 million worth of government-owned surplus
foods distributed through State welfare ofﬁces, in 1954–56, and
more than $140 million in government-owned surplus feed grains
distributed to farm and ranch families, with $26 million more in
hay as well, for “foundation livestock” maintenance (keeping herds
viable for the return of normal conditions, such as keeping dairy
cattle healthy). that this idea did not appear in 2002. $184 million
were spent on beef and pork products, $260 million were provided
for emergency credit and livestock loans, and assorted smaller
amounts are mentioned.
As noted earlier, the fundamental problem facing American
agriculture of this era was overproduction, and the consequences
of the surplus were serious. “Of the farm families that are almost
wholly dependent upon income from agriculture, as a rule only
those on medium-sized to large, commercial farms can be said to
live well. In 1949, 1.2 million of the latter (22 percent of all farms)
accounted for 73 percent of the Nation's gross cash farm market-
ings”. (Eisenhower, 1954: 91–92). Also in 1949, about 1.5 million
farm families (29 percent) netted from all sources less than $1000
of cash income per family, and produced too little to obtain
meaningful beneﬁt from the agricultural support programs. The
proposed solution was clear then as before and after: “relatively
small farms must ultimately be replaced by more efﬁcient, large-
scale family farms.” (Eisenhower, 1954: 92).4. “Managing” the impacts of drought
The March 5, 1957 President's Drought Message entitled “Al-
leviating Emergency Conditions Brought About by Prolonged
Drought and Other Severe Natural Disasters”, (Eisenhower, 1957)
mentioned above was ostensibly the report on the President's
Table 3
Average [annual] commercial fertilizer use (tons) (from USDA 1961 Agricultural
Statistics, table 695).
State 1940–1944 1950–1954 1958
Arizona 14,918 120,938 195,979
California 348,787 1,534,729 2,589,263
Colorado 7640 47,532 89,058
Illinois 198,298 1,304,740 1,596,739
Iowa 45,087 487,169 695,519
Kansas 28,324 210,387 290,657
Nebraska 2027 119,360 305,062
New Mexico 4130 22,152 41,111
Oklahoma 14,827 151,356 133,923
Texas 158,310 581,097 665,376
United States 10,483,899 21,832,547 25,312,672
Table 4
Yield gains for corn and wheat by decade: 1930–1970.
11-Year running ave. Corn (BU/acre) Wheat (BU/acre)
1930 24.4 13.6
1940 30.6 15.3
1950 39.4 17.4
1960 60.1 23.9
1970 81.7 29.5
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the report asserted that existing programs and agencies needed
some tuning but were mainly sufﬁcient. The most striking appeal
was for increased opportunities off-farm and assistance in estab-
lishing diversiﬁed rural economic bases to increase community
and regional resilience through improved education and de-
creased dependence on marginal small farms. Remarkably, the
assembled experts persisted in calling for rural diversiﬁcation in
response to inevitably declining small farm economics while
doggedly upholding their ingrained conviction of the importance
of supporting those farms (Cochrane and Runge, 1992).
The 1958 Economic Report mentioned drought a total of three
times. “A long drought in the Southwest has ended.” (P. 34). And,
drought is “broken” (Eisenhower, 1958: 37). But even with the
worst of the drought, the all-crop production index for 1957
equaled the record-setting 1956. “Although drought in the Great
Plains is no longer a matter of immediate concern, important re-
commendations conveyed in the Presidential Drought Message of
March 5, 1957, should be implemented…” (Eisenhower, 1958: 69–
70). If largely innocent of drought coverage, however, the 1958
Report acknowledged rural socioeconomic trends: “ … recent
declines in the number of farms have been heaviest among those
too small to provide an adequate level of living from agriculture
alone.” (Eisenhower, 1958: 67). Eisenhower continued to urge
various programs for rural development, not merely increasing
loans for emergencies, continued federal reacquisition of lands
under the Bankhead–Jones Farm Tenant Act (1937) and also ex-
pansion of vocational education and rural economic development.
The policy basis was long-established: off-farm income was clearly
essential for many, perhaps most of what had once been the sine
qua non of American self-sufﬁciency: the small family farm. By
1959, the U.S. was in the process of emerging from a relatively
mild recession. It had been triggered in part by increased pro-
duction in most sectors during 1957, followed by a drop in con-
sumption and administration attempts to build conﬁdence (Pach
and Richardson, 1991: 175–177). The exceptionally favorable
growing conditions of 1958, due in part to the end of the drought
in most areas, worked with farm programs not yet adjusted to
rapid productivity increase to result in these enormous costs. The
majority of farm people derived little or no beneﬁt from price
supports; nearly one-third of farms were part-time and re-
sidential, and this sector produced only 2 percent of farm product
sales. “Clearly, the welfare of the families on low-production farms
is more closely linked with the expanding nonfarm sector of our
economy than with agriculture as such.” (Eisenhower, 1959: p. 99).
The prices received for all farm products simply failed to show
effects of drought in any direct fashion. Price supports and other
programs propped up farm incomes to some extent, but the in-
come from nonfarm sources remained important. Even by 1958,
employment in agriculture, forestry and ﬁsheries in the drought
areas was only one ﬁfth of total employment in the region iden-
tiﬁed as affected, moderating the impacts (Special Assistant, 1958:
5). “Even during the recent drought, the area did not meet the
criteria for sustained low income farm areas used under the Rural
Development Program. The median family income for the group of
States in the problem area runs slightly below the median income
for the entire country.” (Special Assistant, 1958: 6). The 1958 re-
port is of enduring interest because of its recommendation (ap-
parently in vain) of a technique dubbed the “water-economic”
budget, which “contemplates a balancing of the economy of the
region with respect to water availability and other economic seg-
ments of the region.” (p. 33). Preparation of such a budget would
involve broad public participation, and other very contemporary
components.
Unlike the mechanization of farming, fertilizer use did not
display signiﬁcant economies of scale, but it was a signiﬁcantfactor in the enormous increase in post-World War II farm pro-
ductivity. An “Economy of scale”, a widely-used concept in eco-
nomics, is said to be achieved when as an industry grows (i.e.
increases its scale) and the number of production units increase,
then the input costs (on average) are be reduced.
In the 1950s, the marginal increases in yield (Table 4) asso-
ciated with the beginning of fertilization and other biochemical
inputs were impressive. The use of fertilizers (Table 3) in selected
states shows not only increasing use, but increasing annual costs
required for production. The drought-limited farmers could take
only smaller advantage of this technology, compared to those with
irrigation or more reliable rain.
The resulting increases in productivity were quite signiﬁcant
for national levels of production and the problem of marketing the
surplus. Newman (1978: 50) reports the following 11-year running
averages for productivity (Table 4):
Marginal yield gains were present during the 1940s, possibly
reﬂecting wartime production maximization as well as the be-
ginnings of intensive fertilization, but they expanded dramatically
through and beyond the 1950s. Corn productivity showed a
spectacular rise, and important gains are visible for wheat, which
is the crop most widely distributed throughout the area affected
by the 1950s drought. This contributed to the lack of national-scale
impacts from profound regional drought, because of the national
markets for these commodity crops.
4.1. Farm demographics
The demographic context of the 1950s drought includes the
general trends affecting farms, such as need for off-farm employ-
ment for many, and the urbanization of the American population
and economy. The drought area in the 1950s was more agri-
culturally dependent, with 23 percent of the economy, than the U.
S., 15 percent, and a less urban population, 54 percent, than the U.
S., at 64 percent, but even so, the Special Assistant to the President
for Public Works Planning (1958) found that at least 1/3 of farm
youth in the drought area would leave in the 1950–1960 decade.
Nationally, urban areas grew 29 percent in this decade, and this
trend was followed in the drought states also. Oklahoma grew
4.3 percent total, but 28.5 percent in urban areas, with a net
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48.6 percent contrasted with rural decline of 16.7 percent. Kansas's
urban areas grew 33.8 percent, while the rural population fell
6.8 percent, and total population climbed 14.3 percent (1960
Census, Urban and Rural Population). There was also a qualitative
shift in the transformation of regional centers to urban economies
and new metropolitan areas not as connected to the rural and
agricultural economies, not least because of the dwindling number
of people living on farms compared to those employed in other
sectors. Examples include Amarillo (up 85.3 percent), Denver
(61.1%), Fort Worth (59.3%), Oklahoma City (56%), Pueblo (41%),
Topeka (34%), and Wichita (50.6%), to say nothing of Phoenix, up
155.5 percent despite the ailing cotton business (USDOC(1960)
Census, Population of Urbanized Areas). Meanwhile, farm popu-
lation had already been falling, even where other parts of the rural
population were changing in different ways. From 1920-1930, net
loss from farms was 19%, 6.1 million people. From 1930–1940, 13%
left, another 3.5 million. And from 1940–1950, 31% left, yet an-
other 8.6 million. These trends were thus well established long
before the droughts of the 1930s and 1950s (USDA, 1956, Farm
Population). Beale (1980: 37) provides the following measures of
this demographic shift through the 1950s (Table 5):
One small-area study in Texas found that once a farm person
had left, for whatever reason, the departure was irreversible
(Borchert, 1971). An important feature of the drought in the 1950s
and associated demographics is that some of the fastest growth in
skilled labor and artisan jobs in the drought states was coin-
cidentally taking place in the expanding petroleum, aluminum and
aircraft industries (Special Assistant to the President for Public
Works Planning, 1958). Borchert concluded from such evidence
that farm depopulation was overwhelmingly the trend. The pre-
sent review conﬁrms Warrick's position (1983) that migration
within the region was signiﬁcant, and that drought may have had
some effect on this, but how much is hard to judge. Non-agri-
cultural factors were already at work and the above-mentioned
trends were unmistakable before and after the drought. Within
agriculture, one may attribute some of the depopulation to the
need to realize economies of scale in the use of farm mechaniza-
tion which increasingly reduced labor (discussed below). Large
machines which could handle large areas of ﬁeld operations with
one operator reduced costs of production per area or unit where
labor costs are important, as was the case in farming (and still
is…). Dorner (1980: 53) claims this as the reason for loss of million
people a year in the 40s and 50s; but again, this appears to be
independent of the drought and climate impacts. A review of the
“booster” literature of the railroad land promoters, through clas-
sics on the Great Plains such as Kraenzel's work (1955), and
drought-related documents of the 50s from Eisenhower Special
Assistant (1958), reveals insistence on the value of a diversiﬁed
economy is a common and continuing prescription for ideals of
local stability and service provision as well as, later, a response to
the decreasing need for farm labor (Ottoson et al., 1966; Blouet
and Luebke, 1979).Table 5
Decadal changes in farm population as a percent of U.S. Total and Rural 1920–1970.
Farmers as % of U.S. Total Farm population as % of U.S. Rural total
1920 30.1 61.8
1950 15.3 42.3
1960 8.7 28.9
1970 4.8 18.04.2. Farm structure and operations
The heart of the issues of impact and response lies in the
identiﬁcation of the unit of analysis. Most of this review has
concentrated on the national scales of perception and response,
and has demonstrated that there was very little national impact.
The farm itself, however, is the unit of analysis which might be
expected to experience direct impacts and make direct responses.
In this section we look at the ways in which the socioeconomic
context of changing farm ﬁnances and technologies affected var-
ious outcomes in the 50s. In brief, the trends already affecting
agriculture seem to persuasively explain the outcomes.
“Economics is the dominant force leading to the introduction of
technologies, some of which may be inappropriate. The longer
term risks are not being suitably weighed against short term
gains. The longer term risks are heightened by increased capital
investment. Furthermore, from a purely economic standpoint,
the ﬁnancial resources of many farmers are so low that they
could not survive a severe two year drought (Rieﬂer 1978).”
Dregne et al., in Rosenberg 1980: 21; reporting conclusions
from a task group at the AAAS symposium on North American
droughts.
The AAAS symposium in 1980 thus stated in effect that many
farms (using the term here to mean ﬁrms or enterprises of a
particular sort) would be vulnerable to a two year drought at that
time. There is ample evidence of such vulnerability of perhaps a
very large majority of farms in the 1890s, a still substantial portion
of farms in the 1930s, and a much lower fraction in the 1950s.
Warrick's thesis is that shifting the impact to larger scales of or-
ganization made that happen (1983, and see Bowden et al., 1981).
Here, we want to consider the context of agriculture as a sector of
the economy, and the conditions that made it more or less vul-
nerable to the Drought of the 1950s.5. Technological changes
In the 1960 Yearbook of Agriculture, Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture Earl Butz wrote that the 1950s would eventually be
known as the decade of scientiﬁc breakthroughs. Advances in
technology and their impacts are discussed in this section.
5.1. Improvements in equipment
Pinches (1960) observed that horseless farming had been de-
monstrated as practical by 1925. In 1910, farmers had 50,000 au-
tomobiles, and nearly 4 million in 1925. The number of tractors
was 500,000 in 1925, doubling by 1935, despite the depression,
and more than doubled again by 1945. The number of farms with
central-station (that is, non-self-generated) electricity expanded
enormously from 1925 through 1935 and after. In 1910, there were
$2.7 billion worth of horses and mules, and $1.3 billion of other
machinery and equipment. By 1940, horses and mules were down
to $1.3 billion, and machinery was up to $3.1 billion. By 1959, farm
tractors alone were worth $3.4 billion, and with other machinery,
trucks and automobiles added up to $16 billion in farm power
equipment (see also Goodsell (1960) and others in the 1960
Yearbook of Agriculture). Good weather in the late 40s and early
50s, and changing ﬁnancial conditions, along with technological
improvements such as rubber tires for bigger tractors, ever more
specialized implements and the absence of effective production
disincentives, promoted “sodbusting”. During these years the
cultivation of marginal lands increased notably, as shown in de-
tailed studies such as Knollenberg's work on Eastern Colorado
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equipment over the roads and to cultivate additional land not
contiguous to other holdings. These increasing costs occurred
when farm expansion was almost imperative to increase proﬁts;
this is discussed further this below.
There were immediate consequences of the change from horses
to machinery, not least of which was conversion from rotation
practices featuring small grains and hay for feed to cash cropping,
and the hard-to-measure effects on soils from that and use of ever-
heavier equipment. But also, the equipment needed was no longer
self-reproducing, let alone capable of foaling at a proﬁt. Perhaps
symbolically, the January 1955 Montgomery Ward's nationally-
distributed mail-order catalogue dropped the horse work harness.
The ﬁnancial consequences of this shift have been argued ever
since; a general conclusion is that “heavy investments in large
equipment and other capital costs” may have forced many farmers
into “expansion of cultivation into marginal areas” (Rosenberg
1980: 109). The questions of the consequences of this tendency
(increased capacity and decreasing resilience) are complex and led
the research direction into some of the following issues.
5.2. Irrigation and the rise of groundwater use
As Saarinen's survey conﬁrmed (1966), irrigation is always the
ﬁrst impulse in response to drought, or “premier adjustment”. The
adoption of irrigation in the drought areas in the 50s was, how-
ever, already underway, and seems to have been driven by farm-
ers' capital capacities, and the series of technical improvements in
the efﬁcient high-lift pumps that made center-pivot systems fea-
sible. In the 1930s and 40s, pump technologies progressed quickly,
often using increasingly reliable gasoline engines, borehole drilling
technologies invented for the oil industry, and high-lift turbine
pumps (available after 1930). The breakthrough for the 1950s,
however, was the new center-pivot system. These spread rapidly
in the areas afﬂicted by the 1950s drought, although not ne-
cessarily associated with or in response to it. The center-pivot
innovation promised (and delivered) effective delivery of water to
crops grown in sandy and otherwise inadequate (and highly ero-
sive) soils. The spread of this technology facilitated cultivation of
soils previously deemed too poor to farm. Irrigated acreage in
Kansas totaled somewhat more than 250,000 acres in 1940 and by
1954 grew to more than 420,000 acres. By 1955, more than
537,000 acres and by 1959, more than 1,000,000 acres enjoyed
“delivered water,” outside of river and ditch-irrigated area (Hurt,
1981).
One important consideration for irrigators is that surface wa-
ters in the drought-afﬂicted states were effectively fully appro-
priated, but ground water (as used by the center-pivot and well
systems) was essentially unregulated until very recently (Getches,
2008). The famous Ogallala Aquifer, groundwater in other parts of
Texas and New Mexico, and other water sources were literally free
for the taking when these systems were introduced.
Adoption of groundwater sources for surface irrigation was a
relatively novel response, beginning in the 1940s (see Kromm and
White, 1992 for historical treatments). USDA Census of Agriculture
data provide some information, which suggests that the most
important increases in ground-water use may have been in re-
sponse to the drought, but lagged, perhaps for ﬁnancial reasons
(Gollehon et al., 2006).
The use of groundwater became substantially more economic
with changes in drilling and pumping technology, which were
independent of the Drought. Clearly, the stimulus for adoption was
stronger with precipitation deﬁcits. Maas and Anderson (1986)
report that in Northeastern Colorado the number of farms de-
creased by 42% between 1950 and 1970, while the average irri-
gated farm size almost doubled (as did average size for all farms).The causality for the surge in groundwater irrigation certainly
includes the increasing mechanization and fertilization of farms,
also changing the farm ﬁnancial structure. Together, all the chan-
ges resulted in tapping a resource previously little used, and be-
ginning the problems of sustainability of groundwater use
(Kromm and White, 1992).
The increase in use of groundwater for irrigation was certainly
related to the stimulus of drought, as well as availability of the
technologies, cheap energy, and relatively high producer prices
(those received by farmers). Groundwater use in the central U.S.
followed a northward trend, reﬂecting agricultural values, tech-
nology diffusion and market values (Kromm and White, 1992;
USGS 1990, 1994,1999), moving from Texas toward the Sandhills of
Nebraska. The exact role of the drought of the 1950s varied from
place to place, as revealed by the various state water historical
proﬁles (USGS, 1990). For instance, Oklahoma had enormous sur-
face water development projects in the 1950s (USGS 1990, 1994),
providing reservoirs and shipping access. Texas had already ex-
perienced signiﬁcant drops in the water table before the drought
of the 1950s (Hughes and Magee, 1956; Kromm and White, 1992),
while there were only demonstration projects in the Sandhills
(Gaul, 1992; Musick and Stewart, 1992). In urban uses, a case study
of Wichita (Aucott and Myers, 1998) shows that large-scale
groundwater use began with 25 new wells in 1940 and urban use
increased that to 55 wells by 1959.
The drought was one of several factors stimulating the adop-
tion of this response. The trends were underway and were
sometimes, as in the case of center-pivot systems using wells,
considerably stronger years after the drought than during it (e.g.
Knollenberg, 1996: 501; Kromm and White, 1992; USGS, 1990;
1994). The use of groundwater in particular illustrates the
“ratcheting” nature of agricultural expansion in general. In-
tensiﬁcation or expansion may result from various promotional
factors, but retreat or reversal may not occur in a similarly orderly
fashion. Drought may have stimulated increased use, but return of
good weather did not stimulate decrease.
5.3. Soil erosion and control
One response to “The Fifties” (Doerr, 1960) was increased ex-
penditure on soil erosion control, following the 1930s programs
establishing the Soil Conservation Service (Egan, 2006; Worster,
1979). The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works
Planning (1958) claimed more than $18 million spent on wind
erosion control, increasing New Deal programs. Switching crops,
another important drought response, seems to have been much
more widely practiced in the 1950s than in the 1930s; for example
eastern Colorado did surprisingly well despite serious moisture
deﬁcits (Knollenberg, 1996). In the 1957 Economic Report Pre-
sident Eisenhower claimed that Congress' creation of the Soil Bank
in 1956 had been encouraging, but too late to affect most planting.
The administration's goal was to take almost one of every nine
acres out of production by use of the Soil Bank and the Con-
servation Reserve Program, which paid for transfer of use to con-
servation and provided reimbursement for some initial costs. That
program, however, usually diverted cropping from the lowest
yielding acres, encouraging intensiﬁed crop production on the
better land, so output was little reduced (a traditional problem
associated with what had become, by the mid-1950s, a “tradi-
tional” program).
It should be noted, as pointed out by one of the reviewers of
this paper, that the mechanization of cotton highlights one pro-
blem of the era (Holley, 2000). The mechanization did not ne-
cessarily displace people, but rather, people may wanted to get out
of farming and mechanization was required to substitute for the
lack of available labor.
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By 1950, land use changes introduced in response to the 1930s
had been largely reversed. The central Great Plains, 90 percent of
the land plowed in the 1920s was again being plowed, including
60 percent of the land abandoned in the 1930s Dust Bowl re-
sponse, and also several million new acres of wheat as well
(Hewes 1975: 208–209). Why did that not result in wholesale
misery when drought returned? Following those counties studied,
Hewes found little use of the Conservation Reserve Program in the
late 1950s. Between 1954 and1962, nearly 400 farms were con-
solidated into others, out of 882 to start; small farms were simply
uneconomic. This is what Kraenzel (1955) and other scholars had
urged: farms must be large enough to have sufﬁcient reserves to
be what we now call resilient. But the ﬂaw in the argument is that
the turnover was not sudden and not timed to follow the drought,
as it had been in the 30s. Moreover, outcomes were much more
complicated, as Knollenberg shows in similarly detailed study of
some other counties (1996; see also Borchert, 1971). Thus, for
some farmers the drought of the 50s was likely “the straw that
broke the camel's back,” but it is obvious that the herd was already
being severely thinned.
6.1. Family farms and tenure
The trends begun in the 1930s continued through the 1950s, in
number of farms, average size, farm mortgage debt, per acre value
of land and buildings (Fite, 1964; United States Congress, 1979,
1980; Cochrane and Runge, 1992). The number of farms, as sepa-
rate enterprises, steadily decreased every decade, according to all
sources, although the general trend was deﬁed slightly during the
1950s by the increase in the category of cash grain farms. In fact,
the decrease in farms in general was somewhat slowed during the
1950s (Lins and Barry, 1980). This is the opposite of the prediction
one would make from claims of drought aggravating the vulner-
ability of farms. Agricultural land values almost doubled in the
1950s, and farm debt increased by a little more than double, but
the increases in farm mortgage debt in later decades were much
bigger (Lins and Barry, 1980). But there was considerable change in
the smaller farms. Consolidation and loss of the smallest farms
was well underway before the drought and continued after the
drought as well. Changes affecting such operations were the same
as in other decades: increasing dependence of the smaller farm
families on off-farm income, shown by increasing numbers of
part-time farmers, and increasing numbers of farms that were
residential but not self-supporting (Brewster, 1980). In fact, the
proportion of small farms actually changed less in the 50s than in
other periods shortly after (Carr, 1980:26). The 1940s and 1950s
did exhibit high percentage changes in kinds of land tenure, with
very substantial increases in part-ownership of farms. This may
have been in order to achieve the economies of scale, and may also
represent a substantial increase in part-ownership as a form of
investment and ﬁnancing, as well as a means of transfer where
cash ﬂows are low compared to asset values (see discussion in U.S.
Senate 1979, “Status of Family Farms” committee print). Signiﬁcant
reductions in tenant farming during the decade also occurred
(Carr, 1980: 32, data). However, it is important to note that no
apparent relationship was found at the national level between the
advance of consolidation and the drought of the 1950s. Instead,
the most dramatic increases in concentration may have taken
place in the 19th Century, and then lagging the 1950s drought
during the 1960s and 1970s (Carr, 1980).
Clearly, the large capital investments (or debts incurred) for
increasingly expensive mechanical equipment required increas-
ingly larger land bases, to match equipment capacity and costs; in
the 1930s and 40s, farmers shifted from sharing tractors and theearly equipment to each farm having most of its own equipment,
as those tools and implements became more and more specialized.
The economies of scale there were quite important; in 1949, 23
percent of farmland purchases were for enlarging existing farms.
In 1959, 42 percent of transfers in general, and almost half in the
Corn Belt and range livestock areas, and two thirds of the transfers
in the wheat areas, were for enlarging existing farms (Scoville,
1960: 392). In the late 50s, depending on the region, from 1/5 to 2/
3 of farmland transfers were to adjoining farms to enable use of
the big new machinery (Dorner, 1980: 52). Some kinds of equip-
ment changes were dramatic, such as the shift from daily milk
collection to use of bulk milk cooling tanks on each farm. But most
of the changes were in the form of increasingly specialized
equipment to enable faster soil preparation, grain planting, har-
vesting, and handling of feed; these also required bigger and
bigger investments (Dorner, 1980).
In very practical terms, one of the most important shifts based
on the economies of scale was the much larger capitalization re-
quired to enter farming (U.S. Congress, 1979: 4–5). Before 1945, an
80-acre farm transferred to a new farmer could survive but after
that date, it would more likely be sold and consolidated (Dorner,
1980: 53). Farms were pushed up in size to respond to the price-
squeezes and needs for cash ﬂow (Swanson and Sonka, 1980). This
is important because it demonstrates that ﬁnancial considerations
played a large, possibly determining role in farm expansion, along
with technological factors. In regard to the role of technology,
most of the advances in per-acre productivity of the 1950s were
actually increases in yield from changed and increased use of
fertilizers and biocides, and the beginnings of the modern spe-
cialized seed industries (Dorner, 1980). Those inputs are priced per
unit, and aside from thresholds for delivery and application, have
no particular economies of scale.
6.2. Land and debt
Increased returns on investment were rapidly capitalized into
agricultural land prices (and thus to some extent also real estate
tax values, although this is commonly not realized completely
until transfer of ownership). Increased values in farming that came
from the beneﬁts of government support programs were also ra-
pidly capitalized into land values (Lins and Barry, 1980; Swanson
and Sonka, 1980).
Outside capital, usually debt, steadily increased in the decades
since the 1930s, and in fact over most of U.S. history. During the
1950s, contrary to what one might expect from the scale of the
drought, there were no dramatic changes in the debt loads. In-
creases in the 60s and 70s were similar. The purchased inputs used
in cash grain farming were 56 percent of the total inputs in 1930;
this rose to 68 percent in 1958 (Carr, 1980: 372). It should be noted
that these are to some extent variable costs (such as fertilizer),
which by deﬁnition can be reduced if necessary. By 1960, a very
large proportion of farm land sales were ﬁnanced by credit,
reaching about 2/3 of sales, up from about 40 percent in the early
1940s (Garlock, 1960).
In the short run, the result of price squeezes from inﬂation and
other shifts in relative prices is to drive the less efﬁcient farmers
out of business and, in the long run, to increase the barrier to new
entrants by increasing land prices, and increasing farm sizes. Ac-
cording to Carr (1980), this eventually beneﬁts the most efﬁcient,
established farmers. These trends combine in increased vertical
integration and risk reduction by contract farming, which in turn
foster concentration of production in larger and larger farms.
Did drought, then, promote the trend toward concentration of
production and capital and good land into fewer and larger farms?
That trend is widely apparent from the 1920s on, judging by all
sources. The evidence from the 1950s does not seem to support
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general increases in concentration. The slow-down in the shrink-
age of number of farms actually suggests the contrary, along with a
small decrease in the number of farms with large sales (Lins and
Barry, 1980: 78). Complicated processes are at work, involving the
increasing value of agricultural land, and the generally high levels
of price supports despite dramatic increases in productivity per
acre.7. The 1950s drought: perception and the media
A large and growing literature on climate impacts is available,
because of concern over global environmental change (Ojima,
et al., 2002; Wagner, 2003; Gleick, 1990; Reilly et al., 2001, 2003;
Melillo et al., 2014; IPCC 2014). These reviews and assessments
seem to presume that new information will provide an impetus for
new responses; unfortunately, that is not clear. The 1950s drought
was no secret, but it did not have a large media presence; later
droughts of lower severity and shorter duration have been more
attended to, such as those of 1976–77, 1988, 2012 and the ongoing
drought in California.
Searching ofﬁcial U.S. Department of Agriculture records for
acknowledgement of responses to the 1950s drought proves dis-
appointing. Here one might expect to see reﬂections of the da-
mage suffered, as well as programmatic and policy-relevant con-
sideration of how the drought affected existing programs and
outcomes and those proposed. It does not appear.
Farmers, throughout the 50s, maintained the drumbeat for “full
parity” as their goal (Cochrane, 1979), but this likely held little
relation to the drought. Looking for a local reﬂection, in the ab-
sence of drought in other places. The authors review of several
Kansas and Texas county histories, some written for the Bi-
centennial celebration, found very little recognition of the drought
therein. Rather, the images and stories of drought from the 1930s
persisted in common memory as the “real hard times” (most
touchingly portrayed by Egan, 2006); the dry times of the 50s
barely registered as climatic, let alone economic or social
catastrophe.
Borchert reported various coverage such as a study of farm
economy losses by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, and some
popular press commentary. Only about two dozen items on the
50s Drought in the Public Affairs Information Service Cumulative
Index for 1915–1974, including a few scholarly articles, assorted
USDA publications, Congressional committee prints (six), two
items in Business Week from 1954 and 1957, and four articles from
U.S. News and World Report.
Reﬂection of popular perceptions in the Wall Street Journal
Index (WSJI), commenced with 1955. There were frequent edi-
torials on the problem of the farm surplus, and on 5/5/1955 there
was a feature on “Great Plains Drought Worse than in 1930s”. Three
“Page 1” Commodity letter columns, in the WSJI, covered agri-
cultural output and also 10/18/1955, “Drought threatens Great
Plains” 11/15/1955, and farm foreclosure ﬁgures, 11/29/1955. But in
1956, Eisenhower's farm program and annual economic report
and, then, the surplus problem dominated news on agriculture
until March, when stories reported hopes that acreage to be
planted would be reduced. Weather condition effects were men-
tioned on Valentine's Day, but drought was not mentioned until 6/
19/1956 and again on 7/3/1956. The drought did not hold attention
long; on 7/11/1956, a story noted that “USDA projects 1956 harvest
at near-average”; the next day there was coverage of “Ike reports
on ﬁrst half government farm surplus disposal”. The family farm,
grasshoppers, farm size linked to mechanization, and farm popu-
lation levels were covered, as well as farm efﬁciency, acreage ex-
pansions, and expectations for 1957.Again, the most frequent agricultural topic was surplus. On 10/
30/1956, page 1 reported “Farmers expand food and ﬁber output
despite drought.” On 12/28/1956: “Farmers may face credit
squeeze in 1957”. January 2, however, brought “Size of U.S. farm
surplus stockpile discussed” and January 8, both “crop values may
plunge due to production cuts” and “USDA reports farm surplus
totals down from 1956”. Then on 1/15/1957, there was coverage of
both “Eisenhower goes to Kansas to discuss SW Drought losses”
(the Wichita “drought summit”), on page 1, and on page 4, “Pres.
reports to Congress about farm surplus disposal.” “USDA reports
year-end level of farm surpluses”, 2/6/1957 was followed by “Farm
surpluses decline after four-year climb” (2/19/1957). “ The news of
the end of drought was mentioned as a possibility on April 5, 15,
and 30, and again May 3 of 1957. Attention was shifted on July 23
to “Drought strikes Eastern U.S.”, with more coverage July 26. But
by Fall of 1957, the drought was apparently forgotten, and sub-
sequent coverage concerned the glut, predictions and then con-
ﬁrmation of record crop outputs. An editorial published on De-
cember 5, “Failure of Government farm program” was followed by
page 1 news on the last day of the year: “Farm surpluses to con-
tinue in 1958”.
Rasmussen and Baker's (1979) history of agricultural adjust-
ment programs, and Smith and Roth's 1990 review are notable
because they simply do not mention the drought of the 1950s. In
particular, Rasmussen's chapter, “The Structure of Farming and
American History,” in an important 1980 Committee Print of ex-
pert reports to Congress on farm structure, does not mention the
drought. In contrast, it might be noted, Agriculture Secretary Ezra
Taft Benson's memoir (1962) acknowledged and vividly described
the drought several times, but this volume is a political reminis-
cence, rather than policy history; the difference is signiﬁcant.
What one must take away from the USDA's histories, however,
is the unmistakable conclusion that almost every important re-
sponse to drought in the 1950s was actually a response to the
1930s, or to another problem, such as the surpluses. From soil
conservation measures passed in the 1930s, to the 1944 Pick–
Sloan plan for maximum water supply development in much of
the central United States, Federal involvement was already estab-
lished before the 1950. A historical survey of drought planning in
Rosenberg (1980), found that the drought revived concerns with
poor land use practices and erosion, and contributed to political
activity, but the policy results were minimal.
7.1. The 1930's as a “Memory” context
Don Wilhite, one of the world's preeminent drought re-
searchers, has stated that, “In the United States, the Federal Gov-
ernment became the principal player in the provision of drought
relief during the 1930s…. The Federal Government has continued
to be the principal provider of drought assistance during sub-
sequent drought events, most notably the 1950s in the Southwest,
southern plains and Midwestern States; the 1960s in the North-
east; the mid 1970s in the Midwest and Western States; and the
recent series of drought years beginning in 1986”. (Wilhite, 1997:
25). That passage goes on to note the expenditure of more than $7
Billion in 1974–1977, and nearly $5 Billion spent in 1988; should be
compared with the ﬁgures above for the 1950s drought, even
considering inﬂation. The Federal role was clearly established in
the 1930. The basic repertoire of responses from the 1930s con-
tinued through the 50s (Borchert, 1971; Peterson, 1979; Rasmus-
sen and Baker, 1979; Dyson, 1988). The 1930s became the standard
for deﬁning drought; Saarinen (1966) found that to be the case in
studies of Great Plains farmers, and it has been found to apply to
more people than the farmers alone (Bark, 1978: 11–15; Hurt,
1981; Schuyler, 1989; Riebsame, 1986; Riebsame et al., 1991; Ri-
ney-Kehrberg, 1994, and Knollenberg, 1996, Worster 1979).
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farmers always referred to the dry times of the 30s, but seldom
mentioned the 50s, and when they did, they mentioned shorter
periods of hardship that were only locally relevant (1966:73–76).
Saarinen further suggested that more recent events were more
salient, and the most dramatic images of the 30s retained salience,
but the 50s were fading. One of the co-authors (D. Ware), also
found this in examining Kansas county histories for this paper.
7.2. National security: an additional “concern”?
Peterson's (1979) otherwise thorough treatment of the Ei-
senhower Administration and the farm problem does not even
mention drought, but it provides a useful perspective from his
careful examination of the ideological conﬂict of the Cold War and
its relation to the Congressional and political realities of farm
policy, and the problems of the farm surplus. Aggressive or active
federal responses to drought may have been feared susceptible to
interpretation as collectivist or centrally-planned “Sovietism”.
Republican and Democratic leaders alike, recalled the similar
charges leveled at New Deal farm relief and agricultural manage-
ment programs of two decades before.
Dyson's (1988) “History of Federal Drought Relief Programs”
identiﬁed Presidential power to declare disasters (1950), a response
to fear of nuclear war, the agriculture department's authority for
disaster loans (1949), a response to blizzards, an extension of 1933's
Farm Credit Act, and a 1953 drought-inspired extension of disaster
loans for agriculture in designated disaster areas as the major actions
in the 1950s. Dyson also catalogued a few other loan programs,
subsidies for hay purchases and transportation, and use of com-
modity credit corporation feed and seed. Some additional funds were
allocated for soil erosion control. Judging by Peterson's (1979) ren-
dition of the politics of agriculture in this time, however, Dyson's
note about Eisenhower administration concerns with not spending
new funds rings true. Almost all of these responses were shifts in
allocation or use of emergency funds if not loans. Dyson (1988: 4)
reported that one estimate put the cost of drought relief programs in
the 1950s at $550 million, with 33 states declared disaster areas
eligible for various programs. That ﬁgure should be compared with
the far greater expenditures on the “business as usual” programs,
such as the Commodity Credit Corporation losses in the billions. Ei-
senhower's 1957 “Drought Summit” in Wichita garnered a few
headlines, but the summit was late in the event and the headlines
were soon washed from public notice by the rains that arrived later
that Spring.8. Discussion: vulnerability and resilience
Agriculture occupies a very large space in the human imagi-
nation as well as the landscape, perhaps larger than in the econ-
omy. At the federal level, a “social contract” with agriculture dat-
ing from the Depression, continued through the 50s (Cochrane and
Runge, 1992: 5–6). This may conceal the highly concentrated
nature of the modern agribusiness systems that were becoming
more visible in the 1950s, although they were in some cases es-
tablished as early as the 1860s (Ross, 1980). Fite (1964) suggests
that there have been three great revolutions in agriculture in the
U.S: (1) the application of industrial technology, including tractors
and electricity; (2) the application of science (as chemistry and
biology), including the various biocides, and (3) the application of
business organizational methods to farming. Following Earl Butz
(former Secretary of Agriculture), a fourth may be added (4) the
elaboration of off-farm agribusinesses, adding more value and
employing far more people off the farm than on it (US Department
of Agriculture 1960 (Butz, 1960)).On the whole, the drought “triggered and accelerated” changes
in farm management (Borchert, 1971: 16–17) which were already
identiﬁed or underway, but failed to elicit a coherent long range
drought management plan (Miewald 1978), despite the offer of
some quite thoughtful proposals (e.g. those of the Special Assis-
tant, 1958) for integrated regional management. Total U.S. agri-
cultural output increased by 2/3 between 1940 and 1960, while
the number of farmworkers declined by 3 million. Output per
worker doubled in those 20 years. By 1960, 2/3 of those employed
in agribusiness worked off the farm, although 2/3 of the capital
investment was still on the farm, with 5/6 of the value-added
production coming from off the farm.
By the early 1950s the social and ideological context as well as
the farming ﬁnancial structural situation had been set. The huge
accumulated surpluses continued to dominate policy thinking.
Eisenhower again warned of the problem of statutory (Congres-
sional) formulas for price supports, which stimulated unneeded
production and generated new price-depressing surpluses (1957:
p.62). The Eisenhower administration struggled to keep farm in-
comes up by increasing foreign markets. This initiative seemed the
best alternative to statist controls or other interference with
markets and the ideologically inviolable vision of the small family
farm in the free market. The previously-noted drop in farm in-
comes after the War was followed by declining export markets, as
Europe and other producing areas ﬂourished again. Surpluses
mounted rapidly, and in 1954 Congress produced some 60 bills
dealing with surplus disposal. The eventual result was PL 480, the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. “As
written, the bill represent(ed) the best in legislative logrolling and
buck-passing.” (Peterson, 1979: 43) It authorized a variety of op-
portunities for surplus disposal through, sale, gift or barter.
Subsequently, the collection of disposal promoting mechan-
isms, from school lunches to export for a wide range of reasons,
acquired the name, “Food for Peace” (Peterson, 1979: pp 87–89).
Despite some successes, however, the export initiatives were lar-
gely frustrated. Regardless of U.S. interests or inﬂuence, the ma-
jority of foreign governments sought to protect their own agri-
cultural sectors by resisting “dumping” of wheat or other com-
modities at prices low enough to undercut domestic production,
so then, as now, cheap surplus was a problem.
The slippage between intention and result stemmed in part
from effective cultivation of the political economy, but also re-
ﬂected the powerful legacy of Jeffersonian agrarian ideology, in
which the family farm was celebrated and deemed worthy of
tangible support as a basic element of America.
Taken together, the presidential Economic Reports suggest that
the farm glut – surplus production – dominated agricultural policy
throughout the 1950s while drought had trivial effects on the
national scale, despite its intensity and duration and indisputably
severe local effects. The relative scale of the relief efforts made was
minor, compared with much larger ongoing payouts made through
various agricultural support programs, and failed to capture much
attention. The problems of the small family farm – persistent low
income, generic economic problems of farming, need for off-farm
income – were clearly understood before, during, and after the
drought of the 1950s.
In farming, “larger” has been the apparently inexorable result,
but Carr (1980: 28) argued that larger alone meant in some cases
more highly capitalized and more specialized, and therefore less
ﬂexible, and more vulnerable to ﬁnancial or other difﬁculties.
Kraenzel's (1955) “mobility” ideal related to many earlier practices
of literally moving resources from soil types to soil types, dryer to
wetter areas, and pastoralism as at least an optional alternative to
cultivation. Oddly, these ideas are more suited to smaller and less
specialized operations. “Reserves” become a question of propor-
tion of means to needs, rather than any absolute sort of measure.
J.D. Wiener et al. / Weather and Climate Extremes 11 (2016) 80–94 91As in other situations, relief, especially for disasters, was aimed at
restoring the very arrangements, which had just been proved
vulnerable; the bias is for stability or restoring its appearance,
rather than for increasing resilience (Hewitt 1983).
One of the profound problems faced by agriculture world-wide
is that local supply and demand are increasingly affected by larger
scales; in the United States, this has historically affected choice of
activity and intensity of investment, as well as scales of activity
(Ross, 1980). This information shows some patterns and causality,
but note that complex processes are at work, as shown in the
relationships between acreage planted versus acreage harvested
(sometimes fairly straightforward; sometimes not) versus acreage
harvested and value of crop (a shifting ratio reﬂecting many fac-
tors external to the workings of the market alone). Each year's
ﬁgures are in part determined by the past year's results, so there is
incomplete independence in almost all ﬁgures. Other responses
such as those intended to restrict planted acreage (acreage re-
duction or conservation programs) may directly inﬂuence this
also; as observed elsewhere, such programs may pay the farmer to
leave some area fallow, or in other crops, but provide perverse
incentives to intensify production in “base acreage” on which
subsidies were ﬁgured under many farm bills (Cochrane and
Runge, 1992). The net result may have been increased investment
in irrigation or fertilizers, and increased production from smaller
acreage.
Riebsame et al. (1991) found that gross receipts in 1988 were
actually higher than in the previous non-drought year, because of
successful intensiﬁcation and higher prices. In fact, the recent
drought in 2012 was the largest spatially extensive event (covering
almost 66% of the US) since the 1950s, but agriculture, in general,
was more proﬁtable than previous years because of prices in-
creases (Glauber, 2013).
The dominance of North American grain exports, and their ef-
fect in stabilizing markets and keeping prices low, is very im-
portant. Another aspect of concern about the 1950s drought, and
subsequent events, is the larger picture of response in the Great
Plains. The most important response to drought, in the perceptions
of the 1950s, was irrigation (Saarinen, 1966); and the novelty, af-
forded by technological improvements, has been the post-World
War II rise of groundwater use, as mentioned above.
The lack of novel responses speciﬁc to the pervasive drought of
the 1950s raises a variety of provocative questions: does this case
show that the farmers, bankers and government of the United
States had learned enough from the 1930s, and thus encountered
no real problem in the 50s (beyond reservoir construction e.g.
Lakes Buchanan and Travis in Texas)? Or does it show merely that
the national psyche registered insufﬁcient stimulus to respond?
We cannot dismiss the ideological aspects of the case, although
reaching these issues would require a different and more extensive
sort of analysis. One question for that work would be whether the
anti-Soviet ideology of the day necessitated a stoic refusal to
publicize or reveal vulnerability. In terms of traditional measures
of climate impact, however, the differences are huge, between the
national response to the 1930s and the apathy of the 1950s (and
see Williamson (1993)).
At the national scale, there is only a general sense that adap-
tations already available were adequate. The question remains:
was anything “new” learned from the 1950s Drought? In the po-
litical and policy history, it seems invisible. The rural-urban split
surely affected the visibility of these events. But, what would be
the effects of continuing the persistent and decline of commer-
cially-successful “middle-size” family farming? The vast majority
of farms effectively produced very little in commercial terms, with
a huge number of families supporting their farms (Hoppe, 2014;
MacDonald et al., 2013; Hoppe et al., 2010) instead of their farms
supporting them.There is no foreseeable increase (precipitation projections or
otherwise) in the supply of fresh water in critical areas of this
study, so future increases in urban consumption will be met by
transfers, or avoided by increased efﬁciency in use, through
technological change or demand management. The most obvious
responses to drought have already been made – and continue
being made. Groundwater mining was feasible before, during, and
after the drought of the 1950s.
“Ironically, while our nation's farmers are confronting agri-
cultural surpluses, low crop prices, reduced land values, and
foreclosures, we are systematically mining a virtually non-
renewable resource to produce more in a time of plenty”
(Kromm and White, 1992: 60).
Another way to consider this is in terms of ratcheting re-
sponses, with efﬁciency or savings used to enable the next ex-
pansion of the system. Since the ratchet does not reverse, growth
continues.9. Conclusions
Historical cases such as described here, provide opportunities
to examine the ways in which social, technical and physical capital
are mobilized for decision-making (Laforge and McLeman, 2013).
The present study furthers this analysis by showing how such
mobilizations of capital are shaped by the longer-term trends and
perceptions and their conditioning factors that extend our insight
beyond the idea of event-based adjustment. Vulnerability is in-
creasingly used as a simple antonym to resilience, as these terms
are adopted by wider communities and interests, but the dichot-
omy is not entirely clear here. One of the deﬁning features of re-
silience-based thinking about agriculture has been the presence of
“reserves” as well as “mobility” and “ﬂexibility” in Kraenzel's
(1955) classic formulation. As discussed throughout this paper, one
explanation for the lack of effect of the 1950s Drought is that the
hard-won policies of the 1930s were simply successful in miti-
gating the worst effects. Riebsame et al. (1991) observe that the
basic repertoire worked: urban reservoirs, highly engineered
public water supplies, protective farm policy, including aid, in-
surance and price supports, and efforts to take the most fragile
lands out of cultivation. An ancillary view, suggested by Wilhite
(1997) is that the 1950s carry little weight, comparatively, because
there was so little novel response. Relatively large national policy
changes were invested in the 1930s response, not least of which
were signiﬁcant chapters in the dialogue on private versus public
interests in land management, as in the creation of shelterbelts,
land retirement, and adoption of allotments and “voluntary”
acreage reductions required for various subsidies. These issues,
although never “settled” to everyone's satisfaction, were not hotly
contested in the 50s; while the rhetoric of the time was ﬁercely
anti-Communist, political considerations ensured that funda-
mental policies were unchanged.
Warrick (1983) and Bowden et al. (1981) appear correct in ar-
guing that drought consequences and impacts in the U.S. have
been shifted over time from those directly affected to larger or-
ganizational scales. The drought of the 1950s had little effect
against the backdrop of larger agricultural trends. This is a pow-
erful illustration of the capacity of social structures to mediate
between physical impact and human outcomes. U.S. agriculture, in
the aggregate, comfortably absorbed the shock of the drought; one
could claim that the U.S. was not merely resilient, but almost
stable despite major climate impacts. The causal links by which
socioeconomic context affects outcomes such as farm sustain-
ability and rural outcomes are seldom susceptible to quick
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Three major conclusions are reached. First, climate impacts
elicit response within context, and are not well predictable from
the scale or qualities of the climate variation alone, at least within
historic ranges of variation. This demonstrates the need to avoid
limiting analysis of climate-society interactions to climate alone,
or inadequate sets of social interactions and areas. Second, it is
important that the 1950s Drought, large as it was in meteor-
ological and climatic terms, failed to elicit a major response. This
questions the social capabilities for effectiveness of situational
responses, and even for timely response during slow-onset long-
duration events such as might be a part of a changing climate
(Pulwarty and Sivakumar, 2014).
A third conclusion is that regional impacts had effects on na-
tional policy in rough proportion to the national impacts, which
were minimal. The scale had shifted prior to the 1950s, so that the
federal level absorbs some impacts. The desperation of afﬂicted
areas was outweighed by the overwhelming policy problem of
agricultural overproduction. This raises provocative rhetorical
questions: What might have elicited “foresighted response?” Or,
given the mild aggregate impacts, can it be said that we have al-
ready made adequate responses? How are non-market values to
be incorporated into the long-term? To wit:
“Are expectations of “transformative” adaptations (e.g. IPCC,
(2014)) to climate variation undermined by acting to restore
stability of existing arrangements, instead of increasing
resilience?”
The politics of domestic agriculture and agricultural support
are increasingly obscured by the globalized economy and in-
creasingly sectionalized politics of farm support. The present
analysis raises the issues of the global context, because of the idea
(advanced by Warrick) of “exporting vulnerability”. Rosenberg
et al. (1993), conﬁrmed the strong likelihood that locally moderate
economic impacts could result in signiﬁcant decreases in exports
of cheap grain, as occurred in 2008–2010 (due to drought and
diversions for ethanol productions).
“The Dog Barks, But The Caravan Moves On” Bedouin Proverb
What, in the end, was learned from the drought of the 1950s?
In a very real sense, this is a problem of shortage, and some work
has considered the analogy of persistent drought to climate
change (Pittock and Connell, 2010; Pulwarty and Sivakumar, 2014).
Our study concludes that Americans learned how to consume the
buffer (such as groundwater and soil quality) available, thus po-
tentially making themselves less able to respond in a future multi-
year event coupled with increasing dryness due to temperature-
based evaporative demand. The years 2010–2012 noted the ﬁrst
time since 1928–30 that U.S. corn yield (bushels per acre) fell for
three years in a row (Hatﬁeld, B. Rippey, USDA, pers. comm.). This
remains an area for further research. Perhaps we learned that U.S.
and Canadian farmers will likely live through the next drought of
“50s” magnitude, and so we have not concerned ourselves with
who else may be affected.
In terms of global issues of increasingly vulnerable environ-
ments and populations, the drought of the 1950s offers little en-
couragement. There is a growing appreciation, in natural hazards
studies, that successfully adjusting to stresses at one scale may not
necessarily increase adaptation to stresses at a larger scale. In
addition, the impacts of long-term precipitation deﬁcits can last
long after the precipitation has returned to normal since re-
servoirs, aquifers, soil moisture conditions etc. may not im-
mediately replenished by one good year, with persistent socio-
economic effects. Surviving an event (or events) of intermediate
size may encourage increased investment in the ﬂood-plain, whichis vulnerable to the truly large event (White et al., 1958; Bowden
et al., 1981; Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Report
Committee, 1994; Wiener, 1996; IPCC, 2012). The spectrum of
drought impacts, beyond the yield of key crops, are increasingly
acknowledged (e.g. in the droughts of 2001–2015 across the
country) to extend to water demands (all droughts), wildﬁre fuels
loadings (e.g. 2002, 2015 in the PNW), impacts on river trafﬁc and
commerce (e.g. the 2012 drought on the Mississippi), rangeland
conditions, retail sales, recreational hunting and ﬁshing licenses,
and impacts on international US commerce and markets. Has the
“success” in surviving the drought of the 1950s, and general dis-
interest in the 1988–89 drought, the national attention but limited
national (but strong regional) impacts of the 2012 drought, left us
with a false sense of security? Researchers may bark, but the
caravan of human actions and events moves on.Acknowledgements
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